on the threat to the right to a court in Poland for all EU citizens
(complete text, formal structure, legal references)

1. Petitioner

Association of Citizens of the Republic of Poland and the European Union,
acting under Article 227 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)¹.

2. Addressee

European Parliament
Committee on Petitions (PETI)
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)
Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI)

3. Subject of the Petition

Threat to the right to a court and effective judicial protection in Poland, affecting all EU citizens who rely on Polish courts.

4. Grounds for the Petition

4.1. Serious threat to the right to a court under EU law

This petition concerns a structural violation of:

Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union²
Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union³

resulting from chronic instability and legal uncertainty within the Polish judiciary, including:

questioning the status of judges appointed by the President of the Republic of Poland,
despite Article 179 of the Polish Constitution⁴,
annulment of lawful judgments on institutional rather than procedural grounds,
unpredictable, repeatedly altered court compositions,
controversies over the legality of the appointment of the National Prosecutor,
the widespread use of the “test of independence and impartiality,” applied in a manner exceeding EU law,
the destabilization of the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Court.

Millions of EU citizens who appear before Polish courts are directly affected.

4.2. Consequences for all EU citizens

All EU citizens who:

conduct business in Poland,
participate in civil or commercial proceedings,
are parties to criminal, administrative, or tax cases,
enforce Polish judgments abroad,
or whose EU-based companies operate in Poland,

face real legal uncertainty.

This undermines:

the principle of mutual trust between courts of Member States (CJEU C-216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality⁵),
the recognition and enforcement of judgments under Regulations Brussels I bis and Brussels II bis⁶,
the internal market and cross-border legal stability.

4.3. Risk of violation of Article 7 of the Constitution of Poland in the appointment of the National Prosecutor

Article 7 of the Polish Constitution obliges public authorities to act only on the basis of and within the limits of law⁷.

Public reports indicate that the most recent appointment of the National Prosecutor may have occurred:

with omission of mandatory statutory procedures,
without required approvals,
contrary to the hierarchical structure of the prosecution service.

This creates risks of:

invalid prosecution actions,
annulment of indictments,
statute-of-limitations lapses,
liability of the State Treasury (Article 417 Civil Code⁸),
ineffective prosecution of serious crimes.

This affects both Polish and EU citizens.

4.4. Annulment of judgments issued by judges appointed by the President

Under Article 179 of the Constitution of Poland, judges are appointed exclusively by the President⁹.

Importantly:

No European court (CJEU or ECtHR) has ever ruled that presidential judicial appointments in Poland are invalid.

Nevertheless, in Poland:

valid judgments are being annulled due to the date or circumstances of the judge’s appointment,
judicial panels are considered “defective” without constitutional grounds,
prerogatives of the President (Article 144(3)(17) of the Constitution¹⁰) are indirectly disregarded.

Consequences include:

destruction of legal certainty,
instability of thousands of judgments,
paralysis of court proceedings,
risk that courts in other Member States may refuse to recognize Polish judgments,
erosion of mutual trust required for EU judicial cooperation.

4.5. “Test of independence and impartiality” — political pressure and misapplication

Public statements by representatives of the European Commission—including its President—demanded that Polish judges be allowed to challenge the status of another judge without disciplinary consequences.

However, EU law does not require:

challenging presidential judicial appointments,
examining the individual status of judges,
annulling judgments on institutional grounds,
systemic “testing” of national judges.

CJEU case-law (e.g., C-619/18) requires only that the court as an institution ensures independence¹¹.

In Poland, the test has evolved far beyond EU requirements and has become:

a tool to challenge judicial appointments,
a basis to nullify judgments,
a mechanism generating systemic instability.

4.6. Influence of judicial associations — constitutional concerns

Article 178(3) of the Constitution of Poland prohibits judges from engaging in political activity¹².

Nevertheless:

certain judicial associations in Poland conduct political advocacy, including lobbying EU institutions,
their positions were cited by the European Commission as sources for its assessments,
these organizations do not represent the entire judiciary and lack democratic accountability.

We request clarification whether the European Commission:

assessed the compatibility of such activities with Article 178(3) of the Polish Constitution,
relied on documents originating from bodies whose constitutional mandate is limited.

4.7. Failure to publish judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal

Under Article 190(2) of the Constitution¹³, all judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal must be immediately published.

Any refusal constitutes a breach of the rule of law and legal certainty.

5. Requests to the European Parliament

On the basis of Article 227 TFEU and Article 44 CFR, we respectfully request:

5.1. Opening a formal petition procedure (PETI)

regarding the threat to judicial protection in Poland for all EU citizens.

5.2. Addressing written questions to the European Commission, including:

Is the Commission aware of the consequences of annulling judgments issued by presidentially appointed judges?
Does the Commission accept responsibility for the effects of its political pressure regarding judicial status challenges?
Did the Commission assess the compatibility of Polish judicial associations’ activities with Article 178(3) of the Polish Constitution?
Has the Commission evaluated the risk that EU citizens are deprived of effective judicial protection in Poland?
Does the Commission assess the legal risks arising from doubts about the legality of the National Prosecutor’s appointment?
Does the Commission consider that Poland currently ensures legal certainty required for mutual trust between Member States?
Has the Commission evaluated the risk that other Member States may refuse to recognize Polish judgments?

5.3. Consideration of institutional mediation by the European Parliament

to safeguard the right to a court for EU citizens in Poland.

6. Signature

Association of Citizens of the Republic of Poland and the European Union
Date: [insert date]
Representative: [insert name]

⭐ Legal References (Footnotes)

¹ Article 227 TFEU — Right to petition the EP.
² Article 47 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU — Right to an effective remedy.
³ Article 19(1) TEU — Obligation to provide effective judicial protection.
⁴ Article 179 Constitution of Poland — Appointment of judges.
⁵ CJEU, Case C-216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality.
⁶ Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 (Brussels I bis); Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 (Brussels II bis).
⁷ Article 7 Constitution of Poland — Principle of legality.
⁸ Article 417 Polish Civil Code — State liability for unlawful actions.
⁹ Article 179 Constitution of Poland — Appointment of judges by the President.
¹⁰ Article 144(3)(17) — Presidential prerogative to appoint judges.
¹¹ CJEU, Case C-619/18 — Judicial independence (Disciplinary Chamber).
¹² Article 178(3) Constitution of Poland — Ban on political activity for judges.
¹³ Article 190(2) Constitution — Obligation to publish judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal.

PETITION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT