Report: Is This What the Rule of Law Looks Like According to the EU?
Selected unlawful actions of the current authorities in Poland
Illegal change in the position of the National Prosecutor
The current authorities unlawfully dismissed the sitting National Prosecutor and appointed a new one, ignoring the statutory requirement for the participation of the President of the Republic of Poland in this procedure. In January 2024, Mr. Dariusz Barski was dismissed—on the basis of a commissioned opinion—from the position of the head of the National Prosecutor’s Office, allegedly due to procedural irregularities during his appointment. He was replaced—first by Jacek Bilewicz, and then by Dariusz Korneluk—on the Prime Minister’s decision. President Andrzej Duda publicly condemned these actions, stating that “both the illegal removal of Dariusz Barski and the unlawful appointment of Dariusz Korneluk as National Prosecutor constitute in essence a flagrant violation of the constitutional principle of the rule of law.” The dispute over the leadership of the prosecution service was taken to court.
The Supreme Court confirmed that Barski’s dismissal was unlawful. In a resolution of 29 September 2024, a three-judge panel of the Criminal Chamber ruled that the reinstatement of D. Barski to active service in 2022 and his appointment as National Prosecutor had a valid legal basis and were effective. The Court explicitly stated that at the moment his successor was appointed, Barski was still the lawful head of the National Prosecutor’s Office. Constitutional law expert Prof. Ryszard Piotrowski assessed that the Minister of Justice carried out the change in the office of the National Prosecutor in a manner deemed unlawful by the Supreme Court, and that “the Supreme Court left no doubt that [the National Prosecutor] is Dariusz Barski.” Despite this, Minister of Justice Adam Bodnar refused to recognize the Supreme Court’s resolution as binding, claiming that it had been issued by three “neo-judges” defending their own positions.
As a result, dual authority and chaos prevail—part of the legal community continues to recognize Barski as the lawful National Prosecutor, while the Ministry of Justice pushes for Korneluk in that role. This conflict illustrates an unprecedented disregard for the rule of law: the authorities are ignoring both the statutory procedures for removing the National Prosecutor (which require the President’s involvement) as well as the Supreme Court resolution confirming the unlawfulness of their actions.
Undermining the independence of courts and judges
Since December 2023, the new authorities have launched a wide-ranging campaign against the institutions of the justice system, conducted under the slogan of “restoring the rule of law.” In reality, these actions are dismantling the constitutional guarantees of judicial independence.
The first target was the National Council of the Judiciary (KRS). On 20 December 2023, the Sejm—dominated by the current coalition—adopted a resolution stating that the selection of 15 judicial members of the KRS in 2018–2022 had been made in gross violation of the Constitution, and called on those members to “immediately cease their activities in this body.” This is an unprecedented situation in which the legislative authority is attempting to “forcibly impose changes in the composition of the KRS” outside the statutory procedure.
This is an unprecedented situation in which the legislative authority attempts to “forcibly impose changes in the composition of the KRS” outside the statutory procedure. Let us recall that, according to the Constitution, the National Council of the Judiciary safeguards the independence of courts (Article 186(1)) and consists, among others, of 15 members who are judges, elected in accordance with the law (Article 187(1)). The Constitution does not specify who is supposed to elect them. The current ruling majority has the right to change the rules governing the election of future members of the KRS, but attempting to shorten the term of office of current members through a parliamentary resolution is an unacceptable violation of the principle of fixed terms of office and the separation of powers. Despite this, the authorities continue to promote the narrative that the KRS has been “illegal” since 2018—directly ignoring the judgment of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal of 25 March 2019 (K 12/18), which confirmed that the new method of electing KRS members complies with the Constitution.
At the same time, the status of judges appointed after 2017/2018 is being undermined. Politicians of the ruling camp and lawyers sympathetic to them argue that the appointments of those judges are defective because they were made by the so-called “neo-KRS.” Consequently, they claim that such judges never “acquired the status of judge,” and judgments issued with their participation should be considered invalid. There have even been proposals to introduce a mass “verification” of more than 2,500 judges appointed after 2018—the so-called independence test would examine whether they meet independence standards. Such solutions are extremely unconstitutional, as they violate the principle of irreversibility of judicial appointments and judicial independence (Articles 178(1) and 180(1) of the Constitution). As stated by the Supreme Administrative Court, even a hypothetical defect in the composition of the KRS is not sufficient grounds to question the status of a judge appointed by the President of the Republic of Poland—the act of appointing a judge is a presidential prerogative and is final.
Despite this, the Minister of Justice openly instructed judges to “pay special attention” to judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR that undermine the status of judges appointed with the participation of the KRS since 2018. Already on 13 December 2023, on his first day in office, the minister sent a letter to so-called coordinators for international cooperation, directly suggesting that the current KRS operates illegally. This is, in fact, an internal instruction to politically boycott judgments issued by judges appointed after 2018—the Ministry even announced special “seminars and training sessions” for judges promoting this line.
At the same time, the public debate featured emotional statements by some judges associated with the associations Iustitia and Themis, suggesting the possibility of “civil disobedience” toward decisions of the President of the Republic of Poland regarding judicial appointments. These statements—criticized even by part of the judicial community—were interpreted as crossing the line between judicial independence and political activism.
The effects of this policy are already being felt in the justice system and in the security of citizens. Courts—under pressure from the new guidelines—have begun overturning final judgments in the most serious criminal cases if a judge appointed after 2018 participated in the adjudicating panel.
In January 2025, the Court of Appeals in Szczecin overturned a sentence of life imprisonment for Mariusz G., who had been convicted of brutally murdering three women, solely because the judge who presided over the first-instance proceedings had been appointed in 2021 by the new KRS. A five-judge panel of the Court of Appeals ruled that this judge “did not meet the standards of independence and impartiality,” referring to Supreme Court judgments stating that so-called “neo-judges” do not have the right to adjudicate. As a consequence, the murderer will be retried, prolonging the suffering of the victims’ families.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals in Poznań overturned the conviction in another triple-murder case—that of Serhij T., convicted of murdering his wife and two daughters—again due to the involvement of a “neo-judge” in the adjudicating panel. These cases show that, in the name of political “verification” of judges, society is being exposed to a sense of danger while fundamental legal certainty is being undermined. As Prof. Sławomir Cenckiewicz aptly noted, “undermining the status of judges (…) along with undermining their judgments and refusing to recognize the constitutional legitimacy of the Supreme Court and the KRS amounts to nothing less than dismantling the Polish state system,” which directly threatens the security of the Republic.
The new government has also resorted to openly humiliating judges appointed after 2018. Minister of Justice Waldemar Żurek publicly calls them “neo-judges” and usurpers, denying them the status of judge. In a widely discussed interview, he compared the situation of Polish judges appointed in accordance with statutory procedures to that of Nazi-era judges, referring to the so-called Radbruch formula. When journalists pointed out the inappropriateness of references to Third Reich law, the minister replied: “The fact that they killed people then and not now changes nothing.” Such statements are extremely offensive and irresponsible—they equate Polish judges appointed by the President of the Republic with criminals who issued death sentences in a totalitarian regime. As noted in an independent analysis, Żurek’s remarks demonstrated “a profound lack of respect for the millions of victims of the German totalitarian regime,” while at the same time “stigmatizing legally appointed Polish judges” and equating the democratic Polish state with the machinery of Nazi crimes. This is rhetoric of exclusion and humiliation directed at an entire group of judges solely based on the date of their appointment.
It should be added that these judges were lawfully appointed by the President of the Republic of Poland, and their appointments were grounded in the applicable law and Constitutional Tribunal judgments. Nevertheless, the current executive branch openly encourages the refusal to recognize judgments issued by these judges and treats them as individuals “unable to adjudicate.” As a result, citizens have been deprived of the guarantee of being judged by an impartial, independent court—in such a politicized and destabilized justice system, any case may become hostage to disputes over the identity of the judge or the adjudicating panel, depending on political convenience.
We must also note the unprecedented violation of the autonomy of the Supreme Court. In February 2024, Minister Żurek entered—accompanied by armed officers—the building of the Supreme Court at the invitation of the Council of Lay Judges of the Supreme Court. Without the knowledge or consent of the First President of the Supreme Court, he held a press conference on the premises, during which he questioned the status of Supreme Court judges appointed in 2018, while the chair of the Council of Lay Judges insulted the First President, challenging the legality of her office. Such actions—the minister alongside lay judges against the leadership of the Supreme Court—violate the constitutional principle of the independence of the judiciary. Experts emphasize that there is no legal basis for such direct contacts between the minister and lay judges of the Supreme Court, and the joint political appearance by the minister and a group of lay judges “constituted a blatant violation of the autonomy and independence of the highest judicial authority.” This event is part of a broader, coordinated campaign to dismantle the justice system—note that the majority (26 out of 30) of the current Supreme Court lay judges were nominated by highly politicized organizations aligned with the current government (including KOD) and are actively engaged in political activism. Their use in a conflict with the First President of the Supreme Court illustrates an attempt by the executive branch to subordinate the judiciary.
In summary, since December 2023 the authorities have been systematically undermining the foundations of judicial independence. They attack the legality of the National Council of the Judiciary, challenge the status of thousands of judges, annul unfavorable judgments, manually manipulate adjudicating panels, and humiliate judges considered “not their own.” These actions are in open contradiction to Article 10 of the Constitution (separation of powers) as well as Articles 173 (independence of courts) and 178 (judges are bound only by the Constitution and statutes; prohibition of political activity for judges). It can be stated with full responsibility that the principle of a state governed by the rule of law—where every citizen has the right to an independent and impartial court—is being violated. Currently, this right cannot be guaranteed: the courts have been drawn into a political war, which threatens the deep disintegration of the rule of law.
Democracy Under Threat
The presidential campaign and the dispute over electoral standards
During the 2025 presidential campaign, serious concerns arose regarding the equality of participants and transparency of financing. The National Electoral Commission, with the support of the Ministry of Finance, temporarily blocked the payment of budgetary funds owed to one of the main opposition parties, despite the fact that the Supreme Court had issued a ruling ordering that the funds be transferred until the dispute over the financial report was resolved. The decision to halt the financing was considered by some constitutional experts to be an action capable of disturbing the balance of the electoral campaign and violating the principle of political pluralism.
At the same time, media outlets and election-monitoring organizations pointed to the lack of full transparency in the financing of the campaign of the candidate supported by the government—part of the expenditures came from NGO funds whose sources were not clearly disclosed.
Controversies surrounding the Prime Minister’s communication style
During the presidential campaign, Prime Minister Donald Tusk, in a television interview, referred to remarks made by internet celebrity Jacek Murański, known for his controversial media appearances in the “freak-fight” culture. The Prime Minister used his words as an example of a “sincere diagnosis of social emotions,” which, in the opinion of many commentators, was a surprising comparison—the head of government invoked a quote from a person without expert authority or public office. Some circles saw this as an example of populist communication and a symbolic contrast to the seriousness of state institutions, such as the intelligence services, which the Prime Minister formally supervises.
Controversies over the swearing-in of the President and the role of the Marshal of the Sejm
During the campaign and immediately after the 2025 presidential election, some politically engaged judicial circles and legal commentators associated with the Iustitia and Themis associations publicly called for the Marshal of the Sejm not to administer the oath to the newly elected President of the Republic of Poland. These statements—made mainly on social media and judicial forums—argued that in the context of a constitutional dispute, the Marshal should “exercise restraint” regarding the swearing-in procedure. Commentators pointed out that such calls, although motivated by opposition to the practices of previous authorities, could be interpreted as crossing the line between constitutional debate and interference in the electoral process.
The Marshal of the Sejm himself admitted in interviews in the second half of 2025 that he had felt pressure and expectations from various political groups and legal circles, including judicial ones, urging him to take “extraordinary” actions. Ultimately, the swearing-in procedure was not challenged, but the debate revealed the extent to which the discourse on constitutional competence has become politicized in Poland.
Proceedings of the prosecution following the notification by the President of the Constitutional Tribunal
In March 2025, the President of the Constitutional Tribunal, Bogdan Święczkowski, submitted a notification to the National Prosecutor’s Office regarding the possible commission of a crime involving the violation of the constitutional system of the Republic of Poland. He pointed to actions of state authorities which, in the Tribunal’s assessment, could lead to undermining Constitutional Tribunal judgments, non-publication of its rulings, and interference in the independence of this body.
The preliminary inquiry was conducted by prosecutor Tomasz Ostrowski, but after several months he was removed from the case and suspended from his duties. The case was then transferred to another team of prosecutors.
After the presidential election, the Marshal of the Sejm publicly revealed that during the ongoing constitutional dispute he had received numerous appeals and suggestions not to administer the oath to the newly elected President of the Republic of Poland. In interviews and media appearances, he described this pressure as an “attempted coup,” stating that he considered it to exceed the boundaries of acceptable constitutional debate.
As a result, the prosecution combined both threads—the notification by the President of the Constitutional Tribunal and the statements of the Marshal of the Sejm—into a single preliminary proceeding, recognizing that they may concern the same events and environments. The Marshal was summoned to testify: he appeared for the first scheduled hearing, but did not attend the second, which was to take place in the presence of the President of the Constitutional Tribunal. The prosecution confirmed that the proceedings remain ongoing.
Concerns about the impartiality of the proceedings
Part of the legal community and public opinion expresses concern that the ongoing proceedings may not be conducted impartially, because the current Prosecutor General and Minister of Justice was previously an active member of the judicial associations Iustitia and Themis, which had participated in past political-legal disputes concerning reforms of the justice system.
According to critics, this creates a serious risk of conflict of interest—especially since the investigation concerns circumstances involving relations between the judiciary and the executive and legislative branches. Supporters of the minister, on the other hand, argue that his earlier involvement in defending judicial independence should not be equated with a lack of objectivity.
Regardless of the assessment, the very fact that such concerns have arisen testifies to the low level of public trust in the prosecution service, which further deepens the crisis of confidence in the entire justice system.
Harassment and repression against political opposition
In parallel with the “reforms” of the justice system, since late 2023 we have observed increasing repression against individuals associated with the previous government and critics of the new ruling camp. Law enforcement agencies and the prosecution service (currently subordinate to Minister Waldemar Żurek, previously Adam Bodnar) are undertaking demonstrative actions that often border on legality or exceed it.
A symbolic beginning of these actions was the wave of arrests in the so-called Justice Fund affair. In March 2024, just before Easter, Father Michał Olszewski—a priest involved in foundation projects financed by the Justice Fund for the construction of a center for victims of violence—was arrested. At the same time, two officials, former employees of the Ministry of Justice responsible for managing the fund, were detained. Despite their cooperation, the prosecution requested pre-trial detention. On 28 March 2024, the court imposed three months of detention on the three suspects—a priest and two former ministry officials, Urszula D. and Karolina K. The use of the most severe preventive measure against individuals with no prior convictions, accused of formal irregularities (none had embezzled money or gained personal benefit), raised serious doubts regarding the motives—accusations emerged that this was “investigative detention” aimed at extracting accusations against former officials.
Moreover, the treatment of the detained officials was shocking: they were led through prison corridors in combined hand and leg shackles, as if they were the most dangerous criminals. Such practices—previously rightly criticized by human rights advocates—have now become the “new normal.” Public commentator Wiktor Świetlik ironically observed that the image of “leading detained female officials through corridors in leg irons” would become iconic, even though Minister Bodnar himself once protested against such measures. The case shows a drastic change in standards: the authorities are using demonstrative harshness against former officials to intimidate the entire environment.
Father Olszewski was also treated with extraordinary severity. Although the allegations against him concerned issues related to grants (the foundation with which he was associated allegedly received funds without meeting formal criteria), his pre-trial detention was repeatedly extended. In June 2024, the court extended his detention by another three months. Notably, this decision was made by Judge Anna Kuzaj—a member of the Iustitia judicial association, known for its fierce political conflict with the previous government. Media reports revealed that Judge Kuzaj is the wife of a person accused in another case, raising questions about her potential lack of impartiality. Father Olszewski’s defense attorneys warned that the court was uncritically accepting the prosecution’s narrative, while investigators were obstructing access by the defense to their client and case files. According to the defense, “the prosecution has carte blanche with the judge.” Regardless of the merits of the accusations, it is difficult to avoid the impression that political considerations overshadowed the standards of fair proceedings in this case—the priest was presented to the public as an example of “abuses of the previous government” before any guilt had been proven.
Another target of the new authorities became individuals from the leadership of the security services and law-enforcement ministries of the previous government. Already in January 2024, an unprecedented situation occurred: the prosecution announced its intention to press charges against former heads of the special services—Mariusz Kamiński and Maciej Wąsik. Both had been pardoned by President Duda in 2015 (after a first-instance conviction related to operational actions of the CBA). The current Prosecutor General, Adam Bodnar, however, declared that this pardon was unconstitutional and ordered an investigation into Kamiński and Wąsik for holding public office allegedly in violation of a legal prohibition. In April 2024, they were formally charged under Article 244 of the Criminal Code (failure to comply with a court ruling). Since both had in the meantime become Members of the European Parliament, Bodnar even requested the European Parliament to waive their immunity. Such aggressive prosecution of former security chiefs for a case already settled by an act of clemency is unprecedented—reflecting a desire for political revenge. In July 2024, an indictment was filed against Kamiński and Wąsik. The Kamiński & Wąsik case is an attempt to nullify the presidential pardon and an example of the instrumental use of the prosecution service against political opponents.
Ignoring the presidential prerogative of pardon and escalation of criminal actions
Although the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that the right of pardon under Article 139 of the Constitution is an exclusive prerogative of the President of the Republic and is not subject to judicial review (Constitutional Tribunal statement, 17 July 2018), the Supreme Court on 6 June 2023 set aside the discontinuation of the case and remanded it for reconsideration—effectively opening the door for continued adjudication in defiance of the Tribunal’s position. Consequently, on 20 December 2023, the District Court in Warsaw (10th Criminal Appeals Division), presided over by Judge Anna Bator-Ciesielska, upheld the convictions of Mariusz Kamiński and Maciej Wąsik. After their subsequent pardon by the President on 23 January 2024, both politicians were arrested in the Presidential Palace and placed into custody, ostentatiously disregarding the act of clemency. The prosecution then charged them with participating in votes in the Sejm on 21 and 28 December 2023 allegedly as “unauthorized persons,” illustrating the authorities’ willingness to criminalize parliamentary activity in the context of a competence dispute and despite the existence of a presidential pardon.
An even more extreme escalation: former Minister of Justice Zbigniew Ziobro
The former Minister of Justice and leader of the opposition party Sovereign Poland (formerly Solidarna Polska), Zbigniew Ziobro, faces as many as 26 planned criminal charges—ranging from abuse of power to alleged irregularities in public funds. The prosecution filed a request with the Sejm to lift Ziobro’s immunity and—most shocking to the public—intended to place him in pre-trial detention. Meanwhile, in late 2024, Ziobro was diagnosed with malignant cancer and began intensive oncological treatment (including major surgeries in Belgium). Despite this, a medical expert appointed by the current authorities ruled that Ziobro’s health condition “does not constitute a contraindication” to placing him in custody. MEP Jacek Ozdoba revealed this opinion publicly, causing outrage—he described it as an inhumane attempt to imprison a seriously ill person. The parliamentary rules committee postponed its decision on his immunity due to humanitarian concerns. However, the very fact that the authorities were prepared to incarcerate a former minister during debilitating cancer treatment raises serious questions about their respect for basic human rights. “Should a state governed by the rule of law be built on the principle of retaliation ‘over dead bodies’?” asked many observers. So far, the ruling camp has offered no clear answer—other than cynical smirks (during committee deliberations, a government MP smirked when Ziobro’s illness was mentioned).
Finally, the new authorities also targeted the Constitutional Tribunal itself. Since the Tribunal, in its existing composition, issued rulings unfavorable to the coalition (and since its composition includes former MPs), the government effectively froze the Tribunal’s activity. Since October 2023, the government has stopped publishing the Tribunal’s rulings in the Journal of Laws, in violation of the constitutional obligation. This is precisely the same practice for which the PiS government was criticized in 2016—although at that time the non-publication of several judgments resulted from the Tribunal holding sessions in violation of statutory rules. Today, rulings are not published because the authorities do not recognize another constitutional organ.
Furthermore, on 30 September 2025 (after the change of the Tribunal’s President), Prosecutor General Bodnar took an unprecedented step: he filed a request with the Tribunal seeking permission to prosecute the then-President of the Constitutional Tribunal, Judge Bogdan Święczkowski. This was a frontal attack on the independence of the Tribunal—violating Article 195 of the Constitution, which guarantees judges of the Constitutional Tribunal formal immunity. The Tribunal described these actions as a “two-track attack on the Tribunal, unknown in the democratic world,” consisting on the one hand of refusing to publish its rulings, and on the other—attempting to prosecute its President. One may reasonably conclude that the government has effectively annulled the constitutional position of the Tribunal, treating it as a non-existent body (Minister Żurek openly stated: “today such an organ [as the Constitutional Tribunal] does not exist”). In this way, the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution and the constitutional review of laws—the foundations of a democratic state under the rule of law—are being violated.
In summary
The actions of the current authorities bear the characteristics of systemic political repression. Instead of prosecuting actual violations of the law, they appear to be conducting a witch hunt targeted selectively at opponents of the new ruling camp. Arrests and charges have become political weapons intended to intimidate and deter anyone from dissent. Unfortunately, this comes at the cost of the principles of the rule of law and fundamental human rights.
“Militant Democracy” – the new doctrine of the government
In September 2024, Prime Minister Donald Tusk met at the Chancellery of the Prime Minister with representatives of politically engaged judicial groups, including Katarzyna Greka and Krzysztof Markiewicz from the Iustitia association, and Dorota Zawistowska-Borucka from Themis. These associations have for years participated in disputes over judiciary reforms and maintain contacts with EU institutions, including the European Commission and the Council of Europe, where they advocated linking EU funds to so-called rule-of-law criteria.
After the meeting, Prime Minister Tusk used the term “militant democracy,” emphasizing that—as he put it—“democracy must defend itself, including against those who try to weaken it.” He added that the government “is aware of the necessity of taking unlawful actions and will continue to do so.”
This statement sparked widespread discussion within the legal community. Some commentators noted that the slogan of “militant democracy” was used in the context of intense government actions toward judicial institutions, which could suggest an attempt to ideologically justify increased interference with the courts. Others recalled that the concept has academic roots in post-war German doctrine, but in Polish realities—given the existing tension between the executive and the judiciary—its use is controversial.
The National Council of the Judiciary – constitutional framework and political dispute
The National Council of the Judiciary (KRS) is a constitutional body established to safeguard the independence of courts and the independence of judges. However, a sharp dispute has arisen around the method of electing the fifteen judicial members of the KRS—a dispute which, importantly, has an entirely political, not legal, basis. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland has never granted judges the right to independently elect their own representatives to the KRS—the only constitutional requirement is that fifteen members of the Council must come “from among judges” (Article 187(1)(2)). The Constitution leaves the question of who elects those judges to statutory regulation (explicitly stated in Article 187(4)).
The Constitutional Tribunal, in its judgment of 25 March 2019 (case K 12/18), confirmed unequivocally that the current model—in which the judicial members of the KRS are elected by Parliament (the Sejm)—is consistent with the Constitution. As the Tribunal noted, the constitutional provision regarding the Council is intentionally laconic and establishes only a “minimum standard”—the guarantee that judges constitute a majority in the KRS—while leaving it to the legislature to define the detailed procedure for their selection. In other words, the Constitution requires only that judges form the majority of the KRS, but it does not mandate who must elect them.
Historically, judges indeed elected their representatives under statutory rules (e.g., through assemblies of judges), but this was a statutory solution, not a constitutional command.
In 2018, Parliament amended the statute, transferring the authority to elect the fifteen judicial members of the KRS from judicial assemblies to the Sejm (previously this authority belonged to various levels of judicial councils). This decision provoked opposition from parts of the judiciary and the then political opposition, even though—as noted above—no constitutional provision was violated. The conflict thus became purely political: the opposition and the leadership of some activist judicial associations (such as Iustitia and Themis) deemed the new regulations an attack on judicial independence and called for a boycott of the election process.
Consequently, opposition parliamentary clubs refused to participate in the selection—in the March 2018 vote on the composition of the KRS, opposition MPs did not support any candidate and abstained from the process entirely. The Sejm, having the required majority, proceeded to elect the fifteen judicial members of the KRS with the votes of the ruling coalition (PiS and Kukiz’15). The new KRS was legally constituted by parliamentary majority, but this became the spark for a political war: opponents labeled the new Council a “neo-KRS” and denied its legitimacy, even though the Constitutional Tribunal had ruled explicitly that the procedure complied with the Constitution.
The actions of some judges opposing the new KRS clearly went beyond the apolitical conduct required of the judiciary. Judicial associations with an activist orientation took retaliatory measures against judges who agreed to run as candidates for the KRS or who supported such candidacies. For example, already in 2018, Judge Marek Jaskulski was expelled from the Iustitia association solely for running in the KRS elections, and in subsequent years there were mass expulsions of members for supporting candidates to the new Council.
The Poznań chapter of Iustitia unanimously expelled four judges merely because they had signed support lists for candidates to the KRS. Similarly, the Kraków chapter expelled six judges for signing such lists—according to the association’s leadership, supporting candidates to the “neo-KRS” was considered conduct harmful to judicial independence. Furthermore, attempts were made to discredit and punish judges who became members of the new KRS—at the request of Iustitia, disciplinary proceedings were initiated, and even criminal complaints were filed against KRS members, accusing them of “abuse of authority” simply for participating in the work of the Council.
These actions—public attacks, humiliation, and persecution of judges for cooperating with a legally elected state body—were clearly political in nature. It must be emphasized that the Constitution prohibits judges from engaging in political activity: under Article 178(3), a judge “may not belong to a political party, a trade union, or engage in public activities incompatible with the principles of judicial independence.” Yet the actions described above—boycotting a statutory procedure, ostracism and reprisals against candidates for the KRS, questioning Constitutional Tribunal judgments—clearly demonstrate political involvement by parts of the judiciary. The irony is that while accusing the reform of politicizing the KRS, these judges themselves engaged in politically motivated behavior, contradicting the constitutional requirement of judicial impartiality.
In summary, the conflict surrounding the National Council of the Judiciary does not stem from any gaps or contradictions in the Constitution—the constitutional provisions were respected, and the change of the body empowered to elect judge-members of the KRS (to the Sejm) was lawful and confirmed by the Constitutional Tribunal. The core of the dispute is political: it arises from resistance by part of the judiciary and the opposition to a parliamentary decision. Both the boycott of the election process by the opposition and the later actions of certain judicial associations against the “new” KRS were motivated by political opposition to the reforms of the governing party at the time—not by any specific legal norms.
As a result, it must be stated that the KRS became a victim of a political struggle, even though from the legal standpoint, its current structure is unquestionably consistent with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
Sources:
The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Article 178(3); Article 187(1)(2) and (4).
Constitutional Tribunal, judgment K 12/18 of 25 March 2019 (regarding the KRS Act).
Press reports: election of judges to the KRS by the Sejm (2018); resolutions of judicial associations regarding the expulsion of members for participating in the KRS; information on disciplinary actions against KRS members.
Unlawful concealment of judicial affiliations by presidents of courts of appeal
Recently, Poland has witnessed violations of fundamental principles of the rule of law by parts of the judicial community. Some judges affiliated with the Iustitia and Themis associations have undertaken unlawful actions, intentionally disregarding binding statutes—thus violating the constitutional principle of legality (Article 7 of the Constitution) and the rule that judges are subject only to the Constitution and statutes (Article 178(1)). As a result, parties to court proceedings cannot be certain whether the judge adjudicates based on binding law or instead follows private views while arbitrarily ignoring selected statutes—raising real doubts about the impartiality of such judges.
In response to these irregularities, the legislature introduced Article 88a of the Law on the Structure of Common Courts. The provision requires judges to submit a written declaration of membership in associations (societies, foundations, trade unions) and any membership in political parties. The purpose of this regulation is to protect the citizen’s right to an independent and impartial court and to ensure transparency in public life so that citizens have full information about potential political or organizational affiliations of individuals exercising judicial authority. Information regarding judges’ membership in civil society or political organizations derives from Article 178(3) of the Constitution and has significant importance for public trust in the judiciary—it allows the public to verify that courts are apolitical and free from conflicts of interest, thereby strengthening the perception of judicial impartiality.
Unfortunately, recent months have seen events that undermine these rule-of-law guarantees. The Minister of Justice—circumventing the procedures required by law—dismissed lawfully appointed presidents of courts of appeal and appointed in their place judges with political loyalty to the current government. These actions were undertaken arbitrarily, without the required consultations (including with the National Council of the Judiciary), contrary to the opinions of the judicial self-government, and contrary to the binding jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal. This conduct constitutes a flagrant violation of the principles of a democratic state governed by the rule of law, infringing the constitutionally protected independence of courts and the independence of judges.
For example, on the website of the Public Information Bulletin (BIP) of the Court of Appeal in Poznań, all declarations submitted under Article 88a were removed and replaced with information about an order issued by the President of the Court of Appeal on 7 August 2024, based on the CJEU judgment of 5 June 2023 (Case C-204/21). Presidents of courts of appeal appointed in the manner described above were tasked with publishing these declarations, yet some refused to carry out their statutory duty. On the BIP websites of courts of appeal—including Warsaw, Katowice, Gdańsk, Lublin, Wrocław, Poznań, Rzeszów, and Szczecin—orders appeared instructing the removal of Article 88a declarations from publication. The justification cited the CJEU judgment of 5 June 2023, which concerned Article 88a of the Law on the Structure of Common Courts.
However, it must be emphasized that the obligation to submit and publish these declarations still follows from Polish law—the provision of Article 88a remains in force (it has not been repealed nor declared unconstitutional), and the transparency of judges’ declarations in the Public Information Bulletin is still required by statute. The CJEU judgment did not formally repeal this provision (it only found it inconsistent with EU standards on data protection), and the constitutionality of Article 88a has not yet been examined by the Constitutional Tribunal.
It should be stressed that the protection of privacy and personal data is not absolute and may be limited when there is a clear legal basis. In the present case, the legal basis arises directly from Article 178(3) of the Constitution. If judges had doubts regarding the constitutionality of this provision, they should have—pursuant to Article 193 of the Constitution—submitted a legal question to the Constitutional Tribunal for review. Instead, they chose an extralegal path, arbitrarily refusing to apply binding law.
We emphasize that such extralegal actions by judges and judicial bodies are unacceptable and threaten legal anarchy. The Constitutional Tribunal has repeatedly stated (e.g., judgment K 4/99) that judges cannot independently disregard statutes that remain in force within the legal system. A judge ignoring a legal act binding all citizens—without any Constitutional Tribunal ruling as a basis—violates the separation of powers and undermines the authority of the judiciary. In a democratic state governed by the rule of law, no public official stands above the law.
Therefore, information regarding judges’ affiliations with various NGOs or political groups must remain public and accessible to citizens so that everyone has the constitutionally guaranteed right to an impartial, independent, and apolitical court. Adherence to these standards—pursuant to both domestic and European law—is essential for maintaining public trust in the justice system and ensuring the proper functioning of the rule of law.
The role of EU institutions – interventions and double standards
It is worth noting that the current situation is partly the result of earlier interference by European Union institutions in the Polish legal system. In previous years, the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union pressured Poland to liquidate the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court and to halt disciplinary proceedings against judges who violated the law. A side effect of this was the paralysis of judicial disciplinary accountability—until today, it has not been possible to remove from the profession judges who openly disregard binding law and citizens’ rights.
An example is Judge Igor Tuleya and several others who, despite serious allegations (revealing the secrecy of proceedings, refusing to adjudicate), were reinstated to work solely due to interim measures granted by the CJEU. EU pressure for “free courts” in practice protected certain judges from facing consequences for blatant misconduct—something the current authorities describe as a cause of the “collapse of the rule of law.” While the EU intended to defend judicial independence, in reality its intervention led to the blockade of mechanisms necessary for holding judges accountable. Today, the government cynically uses this as justification: it claims it must reach for extraordinary measures (such as independence tests) because “bad judges cannot be removed in the normal way.” It is difficult not to notice the irony—EU institutions intended to defend the rule of law, but ended up providing a pretext for actions that undermine it.
Moreover, EU representatives appear to be applying double standards toward the actions of the new government in Poland. When the PiS government introduced controversial judicial reforms in 2015–2023, the European Commission and some commissioners (such as Věra Jourová and Didier Reynders) loudly criticized them in the name of defending the rule of law. Today, when the new government openly violates the Constitution, these same officials remain silent—or even applaud.
Commissioner Věra Jourová (Vice President of the European Commission for Values) repeatedly criticized the state of public media in Poland under PiS. Yet in December 2023, when the new ruling majority carried out a forcible takeover of Polish Television (TVP)—removing the management board by parliamentary resolution and installing government-appointed commissioners—Jourová did not express any opposition. On the contrary, these actions were justified by referring to “EU standards” and the need to restore pluralism in the media.
Let us recall what actually happened:
On 19–20 December 2023, the new government, relying on a parliamentary resolution on “media impartiality,” attempted to replace TVP management without a legal basis. Chaos ensued—the TVP Info broadcast signal was cut off for several hours, and there were physical altercations inside the TVP headquarters. MP Joanna Borowiak (PiS), who intervened in defense of the existing management board, was assaulted and hospitalized. These scenes resembled a media coup. Yet EU representatives did not criticize these methods, seemingly because the “right” people were targeted. Does this silence not amount to tacit approval of violating rule-of-law standards when done by a government ideologically aligned with Brussels?
Even more striking is the case of former EU Commissioner for Justice Didier Reynders. This Belgian politician lectured Poland about the rule of law throughout his term (2019–2024). In September 2023, he sharply criticized the appointment of new Constitutional Tribunal judges; in 2024, he praised the “progress” of changes to the Supreme Court forced by the European Commission. Meanwhile, Belgian media and security services revealed that Reynders himself had been suspected of money laundering worth approximately €1 million through fictitious lottery-ticket purchases. In October 2025, Reynders was formally charged with money laundering and other financial crimes. Although the presumption of innocence applies, the facts remain: the man who positioned himself as the guardian of Europe’s rule of law now faces corruption charges.
Even more ironically, immediately after the change of power in Poland, Reynders visited Warsaw and praised the new Minister of Justice. His presence was perceived by the ruling camp as legitimizing their controversial actions—as if giving them a “blessing” from Brussels for taking control of the prosecution and the courts. Viewed through the lens of the charges against him, serious questions arise about the credibility of such EU “guardians of democracy.” Has the “fight for the rule of law” become merely a façade for political interests—following the principle “our side can do more”?
Finally, we must recall another episode: a public statement by the current Deputy Minister (formerly the Ombudsman) Adam Bodnar, who admitted in a 2025 TV interview that a group of judges pressured him to forcibly enter the headquarters of the KRS (National Council of the Judiciary) and seize disciplinary case files of judges appointed by the previous government. Bodnar stated that he complied, and such a takeover indeed occurred—the files of ongoing disciplinary proceedings, including those of Judge Waldemar Żurek (now Minister of Justice and Prosecutor General) and Judge Piotr Gąciarek (leader of the Warsaw Iustitia chapter), were removed. As a result, these proceedings were derailed—the files were taken away from disciplinary bodies, making rulings impossible.
It is important to note that the disciplinary charges against Judge Żurek involved violating the dignity of the judicial office and political activism (Żurek was known for participating in anti-government rallies while serving as an active judge). Yet instead of waiting for a ruling by an independent disciplinary officer, the new authorities simply “shut down” the proceedings by forcefully seizing the files. The decision to discontinue the case was made by a judge appointed ad hoc by the newly formed Chamber of Professional Liability of the Supreme Court—widely seen as a violation of the principle that no one may be a judge in their own case (Żurek, as minister, effectively influenced the fate of his own case files).
In parallel, the constitutionally fixed terms of office of Disciplinary Officers for Common Courts (lawfully appointed in 2018) were interrupted—they were dismissed before the end of their terms, including Chief Disciplinary Officer Piotr Schab and his deputies. All of this was done for one purpose: to prevent disciplinary accountability of “their” judges and to gain full control over disciplinary proceedings. This is a clear violation of the principle of the immovability of disciplinary bodies during their fixed terms and undermines the credibility of the entire system of judicial accountability.
A question of the rule of law
The facts presented above depict a deep crisis of the rule of law in Poland after December 2023. The current authorities—while invoking the slogan of “restoring the rule of law”—themselves violate and ignore the rule of law in numerous respects. We are witnessing open violations of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, statutes, the Treaty on European Union, and international legal standards: unlawful replacement of key office-holders, dismantling the independence of the judiciary, creating judicial chaos, using the prosecution service as an instrument of political revenge, and applying moral double standards.
European Union institutions, which had previously sharply criticized the previous government, are now at best silent, and at worst appear to endorse these actions with their authority. The current Prime Minister previously served as President of the European Council (2014–2019)—should we now understand that he is importing into Poland the “EU standards” that legitimize such practices?
Is this what “the rule of law” is supposed to look like according to the institutions of the European Union?
Do all the events described in this report—bearing characteristics typical of totalitarian systems—take place with the knowledge and consent of the European Commission?